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MASTER AND SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF THE
MASTER TO HIS SERVANT ON ACCOUNT OF INJURIES
OCCASIONED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF A FELLOW SER.
VANT.
The rule of law in regard to the liability of the master to his
servant for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, is
generally laid down as follows: "Where several persons are
employed as workmen in the same general service, and one of them
is injured through the carelessness of another, the common master
of all is not responsible."
The leading case is Priesty vs. Fowler, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 1.
This was an action on the case by a servant against his master for
damages for injuries caused by the breaking down of a van. The
declaration stated that the plaintiff was a servant of the defendant,
in his trade of a butcher; that the defendant had desired and directed
the plaintiff, so being his servant, to go with and take certain goods
of the defendant in a certain van of the defendant, then used by him,
and conducted by another of his servants, in carrying goods for hire,
upon a certain journey; that the plaintiff, in pursuance of such desire
and direction, accordingly commenced and was proceeding and
being carried and conveyed by the said van, with the said goods;
and it became the defendant's duty to use proper care that the van
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should be in a proper state of repair, and should not be overloaded,
and that the plaintiff should be safely and securely carried thereby:
nevertheless, that the defendant did not use proper care that the van
should not be overloaded, or that the plaintiff should be safely and
securely carried; in consequence of the neglect of which duties, the
van gave way and broke down, and the plaintiff was thrown to the
ground and his thigh fractured :-Hfeld, on motion in arrest of
judgment, that the action was not maintainable. Lord Abinger,
0. B., delivered the opinion of the court, of which the following are
the points.
1. There being no charge in the declaration that the master knew
any of the defects mentioned, the court is not called upon to decide
how far such knowledge on his part, of a defect unknown to the
servant, would make him liable. * * * * He is, no doubt,
bound to provide for the safety of his servant in the course of his
employment, to the best of his judgment, information and belief.
2. The mere relation of master and servant can never imply an
obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant
than he may reasonably be expected to do of himself. * * *
The servant is not bound to risk his safety in the service of his
master, and may, if he thinks fit, decline any service in which he
reasonably apprehends danger to himself; and in most of the cases
in which danger may be incurred, if not in all, he is just as likely
to be acquainted with the probability and extent of it, as his master.
It will be seen from the above that Priestly vs. Fowler, does not
necessarily contain the doctrine enunciated at the commencement
of this article. In fact, that case might have been decidel on the
ground that the servant had contributed to the accident by his own
negligence, and stood therefore on precisely the same footing that
a stranger would have done in the same circumstances. And the
whole of the latter part of Lord Abinger's opinion, for which we
refer to the report, seems to show that the learned judge himself
took this view of the principles governing the case.
But in the subsequent cases of Rutckinson vs. The Bailway Co.,
5 Exch. 341, and Wigmore vs. Jay, ib. 354, the same court went
further, and decided in the case of a servant injured throughi the
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negligence of his fellow servants, his own negligence not having
contributed to the accident, that his master was not liable. In these
cases, for the first time in English law, appears the doctrine that
the contract of hiring as between master and servant, includes an
agreement on the part of the servant to incur the ordinary hazards
connected with his service, among which are to be reckoned the risk
of injury from the negligence of his fellow servants.
From these cases, qualified, however, to some extent in the course
of a long train of decisions, has sprung the rule which beads this
article. This rule has been sustained in the following cases: Skil)
vs. The -Eastern counties Railway, 24 Eng. Law & Eq. 396;
Farwell vs. Bost. & Worces. B. B. Co., 4 Met. 49; N-urray vs.
Te South C. B. B. Co., 1 M'Mullan, 385; Brown vs. Mlaxwell,
6 Hill, N. Y. 592 ; Coon vs. S. & U. B. B. Co., 6 Barb. 231;
S. 0., 1 Selden, 492; Hays vs. ITFestern B. B. Co., 3 Cush. 390;
S. 0. 1 Am. Rail Ca. 564; Sherman vs. Boch. 4. Syr. B. B. Co.,
15 Barb. 574; M71'Millan vs. B. B. Co., 20 Barb. 449; Horner vs.
The Ill. Cent. B. B. Co., 15 Ill. R1. 550; Byan vs. Cumberland
Falley B. B. Co., 23 Penn. St. R. (11 Harris,) 384; King vs.
Boston &. Wr. R. B. Co., 9 Gush. 112; Mad. . Id. B. B.
Co., vs. Bacon, 6 Porter Ind. R. 205; Albro vs. The Agawam
Canal Co., 6 Gush. 75; 1Ji'Daniel vs. -Emanuel, 2 Richardson, 455 ;
Couch vs. &eel, 24 Eng. Law & Eq. 77; Wiggett vs. Fox, 36 Eng.
Law & Eq. 486; Tarrant vs. Webb, 37 Eng. Law & Eq. 281;
Shields vs. Yonge, 15 Geo. 349; Walker vs. Boiling, 22 Ala. 294;
Cooke vs. Parham, 24 Ala. 21; Bassett vs. NA or. .Nash. B. B. Co.
Sup. Ct. Connecticut, 19 Law Rep. 551; Hubgh vs. N. 0. & C. B.
B. Co., 6 Louisiana Ann. R. 495.
We now come to consider some of those qualifications of the
general rule, to which allusion has been made.
Where a person in the general employ of another, is injured
through the negligence of other servants of the employer at a time
when the injured person is not acting in the service of the employer,
the employer is responsible. Hutchinson vs. he York, NYewcastle
J.e. Railway, 6 Eng. Rail. Ca. 580, S. C. 5 Exch. 343. In such
case the servant is substantially a stranger, and entitled to all the
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privileges he would have had if he had not been a servant. And
the case of Gillenwater vs. The Mad. J- Ind. B. R. Co., 5 Ind. R.
340, cited below, appears to have been decided partly upon this
principle, that the plaintiff was a passenger in the cars of defendants
at the time he was injured, and it made no differance to their liability
that he was there by their directions, and paid no fare.
It makes no difference however to the master's liability that the
servant injured was not engaged in a common act of service with
those by whose negligence he is injured. Hfutchinson vs. Railway,
6 Eng, Rail. Ca. 580, S. C. 5 Exch. 843; Wiggett vs. Fox, 86
Eng. Law & Eq. 486; Gillshannon vs. Stony Brook B. R. Co., 10
Cush. 228; Ryan vs. (7Ctmb. Valley R. R. Co., 23 Penn. St. R.
11 Harris, 384. These last were cases of laborers riding upon a
gravel train to the place of their employment, and injured by
the negligence of those in charge of the train. But in Indiana a
carpenter employed by a railway company to build one of their
bridges, and who took passage in their cars by their directions, to
go to a certain point, for the purpose of loading timber to be used
in building the bridge, and who was injured in the course of the
passage by the negligent conduct of the train, was held entitled to
recover of the company on the ground that the plaintiff had no
particular connection with the conduct of the business in which he
was injured. Gillenwater vs. The Mad. & Ind. B. R. Co., 5 Ind. R.
840. And, in the same State, where laborers upon a railway, were
transported to and from their labor and meals upon the gravel trains
of the company, which they were employed in loading and unloading,
but had no agency in managing and in such transportation, by the
gross negligence and unskilfulness of the engineer were injured, it
was held that the company were liable, Fitzpatrick vs. . A. & S. B.
B. Co., 7 Porter, Ind. 336. And in Coon vs. The Syr. & Ut. R. B.
Co., 6 Barb. 231, a distinction was attempted to be taken between
servants of different grades and those of the same grade, and it was
sought to make the master liable where the servant injured was to
some extent under the control and direction of the one whose negli-
gence occasioned the injury. But the court refused td make the
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distinction, and their decision was affirmed on appeal, 1 Selden, 492.
And see Wiggett vs. Fox, 34 Eng. Law & Eq. 486; Albro vs. The
.Agawam Canal Co., 6 Cushing, 75. This distinction has however
been sustained in Ohio. Little Miami B. B. Co., vs. Stevens, 20
Ohio, R.; C. 7. C. B. R. Co. vs. KYeary, 3 Ohio St. R. 202.
And it makes no difference in regard to the liability of the master
that the person injured came into the service voluntarily, to assist
the other servants of the employer in a particular juncture, and was
killed by the negligence of some of the servants. 1Degge vs. Mid.
Bailway, Court of Exchequer, February 1857.
It follows as a corollary from the above rule, that the master is
responsible to his servants for his own negligence. He is bound to
provide for the safety of his servant in the course of his employment,
to the best of his judgment, information and belief. -Priestly vs.
,Fowler, 3 M. &. W. 1. He is therefore liable for injuries caused
by defective machinery, where the defect is known to him. M'lil-
lan vs. Saratoga J- Wash. B. B. Co., 29 Barb. 449 ; f Gatrick
vs. Wason, 4 Ohio St. R. 566; Keegan vs. Western B. B. Co., 4
Selden, 175. And the master is liable if he might have known the
exposure of his servant, but for his own want of ordinary care, as
in the case of a defective locomotive engine, which exploded and
injured the servant through a defect of construction. Noyes vs.
Smith, 28 Vt. R. 59. See also Marshall vs. Stewart, 33 Eng.
Law & Eq. 1. And in Roberts vs. Smith, in the Exchequer Cham-
her, reported 29 Law Times 169, the servant, a plasterer, was injured
by the fall of a scaffolding, which had been put up by other servants
of his master. The accident was caused by the rottenness of the
timber used, which was furnished by the master, and he was held
liable. And in M~arshall vs. Stewart, supra, the master was held
liable for a defect in the shaft lining of a mine, by which his servant,
a miner, was injured.
But there is no implied obligation on the part of a ship-owner
towards a seaman who agrees to serve on board, that the ship is
seaworthy, and in the absence of any express warranty to that effect,
or of any knowledge of the defect, or of any personal blame on the
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part of the ship-owner, the seaman cannot maintain an action by
reason of the ship becoming leaky, and his being obliged to undergo
extra labor. Couch vs. Steel, 24 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 77.
The master is bound to employ servants of ordinary skill and care,
and he is responsible to other servants injured through his negligence
in this respect. Wiggett vs. Fox, Eng. Law & Eq. 486; Coon. vs.
Syr. ,& Utica R. B. Co., 1 Selden, 492 ; S. 0. 6 Barb. 231; Keegan
vs. Wcstern R. R. Co., 4 Selden, 175. But if he use reasonable
precautions and efforts to procure safe and skillful servants, but,
without fault, happen to have one in his employ through whose
incompetency damage occurs to a fellow servant, the master is not
liable. Tarrant vs. Webb, 36 Eng. Law & Eq. 281. He is not
bound to warrant their competency. Ib., per Jervis 0. J. -Far-
well vs. The Boston &' Western R. R. Co., 4 Mete. 36; S. 0. 1 Am.
Rail Ca. 339. In Boberts vs. Smith, 29 Law Times, 169, it was
held that where the master directs the conduct of a servant, he
is liable for any injury resulting therefrom to the other servants.
And great latitude must be given to the phrase "engaged in his
employment" when the plea seeks to avoid the master's liability on
the ground, that the servant injured was not so engaged at the time
of the injury. Hence the master is responsible for defects in machi-
nery although the person injured, a miner, had refused to work, and
was at the time when he was injured being drawn up out of the mine
in consequence of such refusal. .Mfarshall vs. Stewart, 33 Eng.
Law & Eq. 1. And Lord Cranworth, Ld. Oh., said that the master
is bound to use due care and diligence towards his workmen, eundo,
morando et redeundo. And Lord Brougham said, "the master
who let them down is bound to bring them up, even if they come
up for their own business and not for his; he is answerable for the
state of his tackle."
But this responsibility of the master for his own negligence does
not attach, if the negligence of the servant who was injured con-
tributed to the accident which caused the injury. Priestly vs. Fow-
ler, 3 M. & W. 1. For he might decline the service, ib. ; Skip vs.
-Eastern Counties Railway, 24 Eng. Law & Eq. 396: Brown vs.
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M3axwell, 6 Hill, N. Y. 592.1 Much less is the master liable if the
servants own foolhardiness or imprudence caused the injury Tim-
mons vs. The Central Ohio B. B. Co., 6 Ohio St. R. 105.2
If, therefore, the servant knew the danger and did not communicate
it to the master, he cannot recover. 231Millan vs. Saratoga .
Wash. R. B. Co., 20 Barb. 449; Hubgh vs. 1. 0. & . B. B. Co.,
6 Louis. Am. R. 495. If the master inform the servant of the
danger, and he chooses to continue in the service, it is at his own risk,
the master is not liable. Perry vs. 3arsh, 25 Ala. R. 659. But
if the master knew of the defect, and direct the servant to continue
the service in a prescribed manner, he is responsible for the conse-
quences. Redfield on Railways, 887 n. 2.
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The rule as above given is that of the common law of England,
and of most of the United States. It recommends itself by its
justice and fairness, though no doubt hard cases will occasionally
arise under it. It is founded upon an implied agreement on the
part of the servant to incur the ordinary risks of his employment,
one of which arises from the carelessness of his fellow servants and
1 It has been held in some cases, Scudder vs. Woodbridge, 1 Ga. 195, that the
rule that the master is not liable for an injury to one servant, inflicted by the want
of care or skill in a fellow servant, does not apply to slaves, on account of their
want of freedom in action and choice, in continuing the service, when it becomes
perilous. And where the injury resulted from the habitual negligence of the engi-
neer of a steamboat, whereby the slaves perished from the bursting of a boiler, the
master of the boat is liable, and would be so in the case of freemen. Walker vs.
Bolling, 22 Ala. 294; Cook vs. Parham, 24 Ala. 21. The court here were equally
divided upon the question, whether the general rule upon this subject applied to
the case of a slave hired upon a steamboat.
2 This has been held not to apply to the case, of slaves, especially where the
employer had stipulated not to employ them about the engines and cars, unless for
necessary purposes of carrying them to places where their services were needed,
and they were carried beyond that point, and killed in jumping from the cars.
Duncan vs. The R. R. Co., 2 Richardson, 613.
3 This dictum of the learned author of the treatise above cited, for which no
authority has been found, is probably based upon the idea, that such a direction on
the part of the master is an actual assumption of responsibility for the consequences.
If this conjecture as to its foundation be correct, there will be no difference as to
the master's liability whether the servant did or did not know of the defect.
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on the part of the master, to use ordinary care and diligence to
secure the safety of his servant in the course of his employment,
both in the use of machinery and in the selection of his other
servants. Further than this it does not go, and therefore any
negligence or want of ordinary care on the part of the master in
either of these respects will render him liable to a servant who has
been injured in consequence ofesuch negligence of the master, unless
the servant injured knew or ought to have known of the defect or
negligence on the part of his master, and by his own negligence in
not disclosing the danger to the master, or by his own imprudence
or foolhardiness in remaining in the service after the danger became
known to him, has himself contributed to produce the injury of
which he complains. But even in this latter case it has been said
that if the master, after the defect has been disclosed to him, direct
the servant to continue the service in a prescribed manner, he
thereby assumes a liability for any injury arising from such defect,
which may befall the servant while pursuing such directions. And
the same exception would seem to apply in the case of an appre-
hended danger from the incompetency of fellow servants, duly dis-
closed to the master.
But the rule itself has been repudiated in Scotland, where no such
agreement by a servant to incur the risk of carelessness of his fellow
servants is implied by the contract of hiring, and in regard to the
master's liability for an injury arising from the negligence of his
servant, no distinction is admitted between the cases where the
person injured is a fellow servant and where he is a stranger;
so that wherever the master would be liable to a stranger lie is held
liable to his servant. -Dixon vs. 1?anken, Court of Sess., Jan. 3rd.,
1852, reported 1 Am. Rail Ca. 569.
It is commonly said that the law of Scotland has been followed
by the Supreme Court of Ohio. See Little Miami B. B. Co., vs.
Stevens, 20 Ohio, 415, and C. C. & C. B. B. Co., vs. Meary, 3
Ohio St. R. 202. But an examination of these cases will show
that the court did not go so far as to repudiate the rule of the com-
mon law. In both cases, however, they decided that as between
servants of different grades the common master is responsible to the
